item almost two and a half times as often as the other individual.
These results provide strong evidence that frequency-modulated bouts repel rivals and thereby enhance prey capture, but they do not explain why these calls exert such an effect. Although this question will be the subject of many exciting studies in the future, the current study does provide valuable insight. By analyzing the acoustic structure of frequencymodulated bouts, the authors show that these vocalizations are individually distinctive, and that individual bats could, in theory, be identified reliably solely on the basis of their acoustic characteristics. If other bats use these cues to recognize callers, as has been shown in a wide range of other animal species [16] , then they could adjust their behaviour according to their previous interactions with calling individuals. For example, recognizing a previously aggressive male could allow an individual to abandon its pursuit of a contested food item, and thus avoid any physical aggression that might otherwise ensue. Two lines of evidence support such a function. First, although male big brown bats often live alone, they do occasionally live with females or other males [17] , making repeated interactions among known foragers possible. Second, some wild big brown bats patrol foraging grounds and use physical aggression to chase away competitors [18] . Taken together, this suggests that early recognition of aggressive individuals could be an adaptive trait that reduces the risk of injury to perceptive individuals.
The Wright et al. study [6] [19] .
More generally, the study contributes to our understanding of how vocalizations mediate social interactions among foraging animals. Food-associated calls are produced by a wide range of species, but most appear to be cooperative, in that they increase the probability that the recipient approaches and consumes the food [20] . In contrast, the frequency-modulated bouts described here function to repel call recipients from food, suggesting that these signals have been shaped by very different selective forces.
Neuroeconomics: A Formal Test of Dopamine's Role in Reinforcement Learning
Over the last two decades, dopamine and reinforcement learning have been increasingly linked. Using a novel, axiomatic approach, a recent study shows that dopamine meets the necessary and sufficient conditions required by the theory to encode a reward prediction error.
Eric E.J. DeWitt
Nearly two decades ago, researchers noticed that the activity of dopaminergic neurons bore a striking resemblance to the reward prediction error signal predicted by reinforcement learning [1, 2] . The notion of reinforcement learning was developed to unify and formalize decades of work in learning theory from different disciplines, combining physiological and psychological trial-and-error learning theories with observations from classical and operant conditioning research and the theoretical machinery of dynamic programming and optimal control [3] . While this theory has been successful in predicting behavior and neural activity in a variety of conditions, alternative theories for dopamine's role in learning and behavior are consistent with available evidence. Further, observations continue to be made that are inconsistent with dopamine encoding a reward prediction error -at least on the surface [4] [5] [6] [7] .
In a recent study, Hart et al. [8] bring together a novel axiomatic approach derived from neuroeconomics with direct measurements of dopamine release to demonstrate that changes in dopamine concentration encode the information necessary to support any reinforcement learning theory that uses a reward prediction error. This work greatly strengthens the argument that phasic dopamine release could play a central role in the implementation of reinforcement learning in the mammalian brain.
Why Reinforcement Learning?
Reinforcement learning is fundamentally an approach to the following problem: how do you learn from the outcomes of your actions, assuming you want to maximize your (long-term) expected reward, without any explicit correction? Early work on this question included Thorndike's learning experiments, where an animal was placed in a box and had to try a series of behaviors until it stumbled on the one that aided its escape. Engineers and computer scientists have asked the same question from a very different perspective: if you want to control a complex system, such as a power plant, how can you determine the best possible control policy -where a policy is simply the actions you should take in a given situation. Reinforcement learning was proposed as an unsupervised solution, where instead of learning the (perhaps unknown) correct answer, you learn the expected value of the available actions in each situation. The core insight is that you can learn which actions are best using only the 'reinforcement' -reward or punishment -you receive, even when the reinforcement is delayed. In fact, reinforcement learning provides a normative framework that offers proof that you can learn to make the optimal choice under some conditions. Reinforcement learning is of particular interest to neuroscientists and psychologists because of temporal difference learning, which uses the difference between the value you expect and what you receive when you take an action -the reward prediction error -to learn what actions or situations are best. Importantly, in a situation where an action will lead to future reinforcement, the value associated with the action predicts future reinforcement -a feature that can explain many, but not all, aspects of classical and operant conditioning. Figure 1 shows the hypothetical reward prediction error used by temporal difference learning in red for unexpected reward and cued conditioning.
Dopamine's Important Role Arvid Carlsson's early work demonstrated that dopamine is a neurotransmitter and that its depletion leads to a catatonic state similar to Parkinson's disease -work for which he was later awarded the Nobel prize. While dopamine was later linked to learning and motivation, it wasn't until Wolfram Schultz and his colleagues [1, 2, 9] began to investigate the activity of dopamine neurons during awake behavior to understand its role in action initiation and Parkinson's that the connection to reinforcement learning was made. In these experiments, dopamine activity was observed to respond to unexpected rewards and to cues that predicted rewards, a hallmark of the reward prediction error (Figure 1,  blue) .
Subsequently, in classical conditioning experiments in humans and animals, dopamine related signals were shown to initially respond to the unexpected reward but, over time, to respond to predictive cues instead [2, 9, 10] . Recently, artificially increasing dopamine neuron activity at the time of a reward was shown to increase actions towards a cue, even when there should have been no endogenous reward prediction error [11] . Together, these features demonstrate a compelling correlation with the theoretical reward prediction error of temporal difference reinforcement learning, and suggestive causal evidence that dopamine affects the expected value of an action.
But this evidence is also compatible with other theories of reward-based motivation, salience and reinforcement learning [6] . Further, evidence is also accumulating for apparent contradictions between dopamine firing rates and the theoretical reward prediction errors [4, 5, 7, 12, 13] . If an expected reward isn't received, dopamine neurons 'pause' -a puzzling feature not obviously compatible with encoding a reward prediction error that we will return to later [13] . Some dopamine neurons appear to respond to aversive events as though they were rewarding or to the 'informative' value of a cue rather than it's predicted reinforcement [4, 5, 7] . Overall, while reinforcement learning and the dopamine reward prediction error hypothesis have garnered much deserved attention, questions remain, including which of the many variants of temporal difference or other forms of reinforcement learning might be involved [14] .
Neuroeconomics and the Axiomatic Approach
In the last few years, the emerging field of neuroeconomics has sought to bring new tools and approaches to neuroscience. The neuroeconomists' goal is to bring together microeconomic theory and economic methods with decision psychology and systems neuroscience [15, 16] . Traditionally, economists infer an individual's preferences by observing their choices. Microeconomic theory tells us that, under some assumptions, we can describe these preferences using a utility function -a function that assigns a value to each possible choice, such that an action that has a higher utility is chosen over one that has a lower utility. Importantly, the mapping between choices, preferences and the utility function is quite general. The theory tells us that some utility function exists that will describe the individuals' preferences but allows the actual 'subjective' utilities experienced to remain incompletely specified. In other words, we could not take particular measurements of absolute valuesfor example, in a brain area -as evidence for or against the utility representation.
If you violate the assumptions of the utility representation, however, you can reject the hypothesis that any utility function from the class could describe the individual's preferences. Economists formalize their assumptions using axioms, and the axioms of revealed preferences describe the assumptions needed for a utility function to predict choice. Reinforcement learning naturally resonated with neuroeconomics because both the predictions of the theory -choices -and the theoretical tools employed -for example, dynamic programming or value functions -are common to both. But the neuroeconomic approach precludes the evidence reviewed above as directly supporting or discounting the hypothesis that dopamine carries a reward prediction error, because it would require specifying particular subjective utilities.
Taking an axiomatic approach, Caplin and Dean [17, 18] wrote down the necessary and sufficient conditions for an axiomatic representation of the dopamine reward prediction error hypothesis. The axioms are over lotteries and outcomes -where a lottery specifies the probability of each outcome and, in this case, can be thought of as a weighted coin. The data that passes or violates the axioms can be schematized as shown in Figure 2 , where the two outcomes (red or blue) are plotted with arbitrary 'dopamine' reward prediction error responses. The lines represent response when there is some surprise (non-zero probabilities) and the filled circles are the response when the outcome is perfectly predicted. The horizontal axis represents the weighting of the coin (red is higher probability of the red outcome).
The axioms formulated by Caplin and Dean [17, 18] are as follows. The 'more is better' axiom: if one outcome produces a higher response than another for some lottery, it should cause a higher relative response for any other lottery. The 'surprise coherence' axiom: roughly, with increasing probability of receiving an outcome across lotteries, if you are less surprised when you receive that outcome and produce a lower response it must be the same for the other outcome with the same lotteries. The 'no surprise equivalence' axiom: you should produce the same response for any outcome, if you receive the outcome when you expect it perfectly.
The first test of these axioms came using a proxy for dopamine release, the blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) response of functional magnetic resonance imaging [19, 20] . While this provided support for the prior work arguing that BOLD responses reflected a dopamine reward prediction error [10, 14] , it is a proxy signal which might not directly reflect dopamine changes at the synapse, where presumably it would be acting. The new work by Hart et al. [8] extends the initial axiomatic work on the dopamine reward prediction error hypothesis and, additionally, addresses another long standing puzzle [4] .
Hart et al. [8] used fast-scan cyclic voltammetry to measure the changes in concentration of dopamine in the nucleus accumbens on a fast time-scale, and then applied the axiomatic tests directly to the dopamine efflux. In their experiment, rats chose between two levers that returned either one or four pellets of rat chow, sometimes deterministically (one lever provided four pellets with certainty and the other with one pellet) and sometimes probabilistically (each lever was a lottery over the two outcomes). In the probabilistic condition, the rats faced two 'weighted coins' where the probability of receiving one or four pellets was Figure 2 . Testing the dopamine reward prediction error axioms. Schematized axiomatic tests. Response to a higher valued outcome (in red) and a lower valued outcome (in blue). The horizontal axis represents possible lotteries (the probabilities for a weighted coin) ranging from probability one (solid red) to probability zero (solid blue) of the red outcome.
25% or 75%, respectively, on one lever and vice-versa on the other, with the 'good' lever switching between sessions. The animals made a mixture of free and forced choices, allowing the experimenters to assess if the animals had learned the value of the levers while ensuring dopamine recordings in all conditions. By measuring the dopamine release in the deterministic case they were able to test the 'no surprise equivalence' axiom, showing that the dopamine release is the same when the animal receives one pellet or four pellets with certainty. Using the probabilistic sessions where the animals experience a reward prediction error on every trial, they are able to test the remaining two axioms. The 'more is better' axiom was satisfied, because four pellets caused a larger dopamine release than one pellet for both probability conditions. The 'surprise coherence' axiom was satisfied, because the 25% probability evoked more relative dopamine release than the 75% for each of the two outcomes. While practical limitations prevent the exhaustive testing of every possible outcome and probability combination, these results provide a different kind of support for the dopamine reward prediction error hypothesis than has been shown before: they provide evidence that the necessary and sufficient conditions can be met for dopamine release to encode a reward prediction error. It is a legitimate question whether we should consider the axioms satisfied, given that they only tested two probability conditions, but the same practical limitations precluding exhaustive testing here are true for all other approaches (for example, model comparison). The benefit of this approach is that if we really believed an axiom is falsified, it would call for a much deeper reconsideration of the theory being tested than merely failing a statistical test.
Hart et al. [8] then addressed the apparent contradiction caused by the non-linear response to reward prediction errors observed in dopamine neuron firing rates. Because dopamine neurons have low baseline firing rates it has long been thought difficult or impossible for dopamine to encode both the positive and negative differences from expectation necessary for a reward prediction error [1, 2, 9, 13] (Figure 1, solid line) , presumably requiring a second system to carry negative reward prediction errors. Interestingly, the relationship between reward prediction error and dopamine release was completely linear over the range measured, suggesting that the kinetics of dopamine release, dopamine re-uptake and other mechanisms removed the non-linearity observed between the neural firing rate and reward prediction error (Figure 1,  dashed line) .
Not every neuroscience theory will be amenable to axiomatization and, while this work does not preclude different dopamine release properties in other areas or resolve questions about what kind of temporal difference reinforcement learning may be employed, it should encourage future interactions between the reinforcement learning, neuroeconomics and neuroscience communities.
